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Abstract: We implement an empirical test
for selection into health insurance using changes
in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our
test examines changes in the cost of the newly
insured relative to those who were insured prior
to the reform. We find that counties with larger
increases in insurance coverage over the reform
period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent
with adverse selection into insurance before the
reform. Additional results, incorporating crossstate variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.

Asymmetric information can distort available insurance contracts, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), or it can raise premiums for the relatively
healthy, as in Akerlof (1970). Both distortions
result in inefficiently low levels of insurance coverage.

Approximately 49.9 million people in the United
States lack health insurance (DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor and Smith (2011)). One potential driver
of uninsurance is asymmetric information on
health risk between insurers and the insured.

Predicated, at least in part, on concerns about
adverse selection, the state of Massachusetts
passed health reform in April 2006 aimed at
achieving near-universal health insurance coverage. The Massachusetts approach is considered
a model for national health reform, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),
signed in March 2010. A central feature of
both reforms is a mandate that individuals obtain health insurance or pay a penalty. The
Massachusetts mandate allows us to examine
whether there was adverse selection into health
insurance before the reform. In contrast, existing
literature generally examines adverse selection
among employer-sponsored plans (e.g. Cutler
and Reber (1998); Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen
(2010)), which is less relevant for policy.
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(jkolstad@wharton.upenn.edu); Kowalski: Department
of Economics, Yale University, NBER, and Brookings
(amanda.kowalski@yale.edu). Funding from the NBER
Household Finance Working Group through the Alfred P.
Sloan Foundation, the National Institute on Aging grant
#P30 AG012810, the Leonard Davis Institute for Health
Economics, and the Wharton Deans Research Fund are
gratefully acknowledged.

Our simple empirical methodology is based on
the observation that the direction of selection depends on the difference between the cost of the
marginal enrollee and the cost of those who already have insurance. If the cost of the marginal
enrollee is below the average cost of those who
are already insured, selection is adverse; if the
cost of the marginal enrollee is above the average
cost of those who are already insured, selection
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Introduction

1

tion is important for insurance insofar as it translates into cost. Furthermore, we can observe the
universe of hospital costs in Massachusetts, and
hospital costs account for the majority of medical spending.
To understand the mechanisms behind our
cost results, we examine health measures and
behaviors. We estimate variants of equation
(1) where Y represents measures of the average
health of the insured. Depending on the correlation between the health measures and cost, the
sign of α is a test for selection. If there is adverse selection, we expect the rate of diabetes (a
health measure that should be positively correlated with costs) to decline in the insured population. In contrast, we expect the rate of regular exercise (a measure that should be negatively
2 Test for Selection
correlated with costs) to grow. If health insurance improves our measures of health, we will be
Our primary test for adverse selection relies on biased against finding adverse selection.
county level variation in coverage. All MasWe can also test for adverse selection by
sachusetts counties reached near-universal insur- comparing Massachusetts to other states. We
ance coverage through the reform, but some re-estimate equation (1) replacing counties by
counties were more affected by the reform than states. Our instrument for insurance coverage
others because of different initial levels of cover- is then the interaction of a post-reform indicator
age. We estimate the following model
and a Massachusetts indicator.
is advantageous. Therefore, as demonstrated by
Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010), the sign
of the slope of the average cost curve captures
selection.
We use the Massachusetts reform to provide
an exogenous shift in coverage that identifies the
slope of the average cost curve. We find that
counties with larger increases in coverage over
the reform period face the smallest increase in
average hospital costs for the insured population,
consistent with adverse selection into insurance
before reform. Additional results that incorporate cross-state variation and data on health
measures provide further evidence for adverse selection.

Yct = α ∗ Ict + δt + µc + ct

(1)
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where Yct measures average hospital costs per
insured inhabitant of county c in year t, and I
captures insurance coverage. δt and µc control
for fixed effects by year and county. We estimate equation (1) via TSLS where the set of instruments is given by the interaction of a postreform indicator and county fixed effects, such
that county-specific changes in coverage over the
reform period are the only source of identifying
variation.
Under adverse selection, we expect α < 0: an
increase in insurance coverage improves the pool
of the insured risks and decreases the average
costs per insuree. Conversely, under advantageous selection, the average cost of the insured
grows as the pool expands: α > 0. Our primary specification focuses on hospital cost as the
dependent variable because asymmetric informa-

3.1

Data
Case Mix Data

We observe the universe of hospital discharges
before and after the reform in the Massachusetts
Case Mix Data from 2004 to 2009. The data provide information on insurance coverage for every
hospital discharge.1 The data also provide information on the total charges for each discharge,
which we convert to costs using the HCUP costto-charge ratio. We prefer costs to charges because charges reflect prices, and hospitals might
have changed their prices following reform. We
deflate hospital costs into 2011 dollars using the
1 We only consider variation in coverage between the
insured and the uninsured, and not between different insurance contracts. Thus, our underlying model of adverse
selection is consistent with Akerlof (1970).
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medical care consumer price index provided by difference in each measure between the two pethe Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
riods in Figure 1.
We focus on hospital costs for nonelderly inFigure 1–Evidence by County
sured patients aged 18-64. Using the patient zip
code, we aggregate hospital costs to the countyyear level. To estimate the average hospital costs
Berkshire
for all insured inhabitants, including those who
do not visit the hospital, we incorporate additional data. For pre-reform coverage levels, we
Worcester
use the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates
Franklin
(SAHIE) from 2005 by county. For post-reform
Bristol
Plymouth
coverage levels, we use the 2008 and 2009 esBarnstable
Suffolk
Hampden
Hampshire
Essex Middlesex
timates from the American Community Survey
Norfolk
(ACS), which is based on a much larger sample
size than the SAHIE but is only available start.05
.06
.07
.08
.09
.1
.11
ing in 2008. In all analyses, we drop the reform
Change in Coverage ACS/SAHIE
implementation years 2006 and 2007. We use the
Census for county population estimates.
The linear fit weights counties by population
size. We see a pronounced negative relationship,
which suggests that counties that saw greater
3.2 BRFSS Data
increases in coverage faced smaller increases in
We complement the hospital cost data with average costs per insured resident, consistent
health measures from the Behavioral Risk Factor with adverse selection.
Surveillance System (BRFSS). We use average
health measures for the insured population at the
Table 1–Evidence by County
state-year level from 2004-2005 and 2008-2010.
We rely on random sample selection into the
BRFSS, which allows us to compare health meaIV
OLS
Coverage -2247.4∗
37.49
sures for the insured sample population directly,
(-2.18)
(0.03)
eliminating the need to merge coverage and popN
48
24
ulation estimates from additional sources. We do
t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the county level.
not weight the average health measures or the
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
average insurance coverage of the sampled population. We drop Dukes and Nantucket counties
The first column of Table 1 shows the correfrom all analyses because the BRFFS does not sponding IV estimate. The coefficient is negative
provide information on them in the pre-reform and statistically significant. If we assume that
years.
equation (1) describes the average cost function,
we can interpret the point estimate as the average hospital expenditure of the insured population as we move from no insurance to full insur4 Results
ance. Moving from the first (most expensive) enrollee to full insurance coverage reduces hospital
4.1 Hospital Costs
costs by approximately $2,250 (about 50% of the
We compute the average hospital costs and the 2006 average premium for employer-sponsored
average insurance coverage by county for two pe- health insurance, according to KFF (2006)). To
riods: 2004-2005 and 2008-2009, and we plot the translate this coefficient into the observed change
3

suggest adverse selection, but they are not statistically significant, likely reflecting the small sample size at the county level in the BRFSS.

in average costs, we need an estimate of the
coverage increase. The first stage regression results at the state level from the BRFFS suggest
that because of health reform, insurance coverage in Massachusetts increased by 5.5%.2 Scaling the point estimate by the increase in coverage suggests that because of adverse selection,
health reform reduced the annual average hospital costs for the insured Massachusetts population by about $124 (0.055 x $2,247) per person,
approximately 3% of the 2006 average premium
for employer-sponsored health insurance.
The second column of Table 1 presents results
from a county-year level OLS regression, which
uses cross-sectional variation in the pre-reform
period. The coefficient estimate is positive, suggesting that without the reform-induced variation differences across counties provide spurious
evidence for advantageous selection.

4.2

Table 3–Evidence by County
Days Health Not Good
Health Prevented Activity
Exercise
Disability
Need Equipment
Diabetes
Asthma
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Conclusion

Our results suggest that increased coverage due
to reform in Massachusetts lowered average hospital costs for the insured, and thus average
premiums before loading, by about $124. This
impact, which represents an average premium
change over all types of insurance, is consistent
with the aggregate change in premiums in Massachusetts. Between 2006 and 2009, premiums in
employer-sponsored plans followed the national
trend, but premiums in the non-group market
decreased by 20% (Gruber (2011)), comparable
to the 3% overall decrease in premiums that we
observe.
Our results also shed light on an important
question for insurers and policy makers facing
the introduction of the PPACA: who is likely to
sign up for coverage, particularly through new
health insurance exchanges? However, to generalize our results from the Massachusetts to
the national reform, we should note that Massachusetts had “community rating” regulations
that limited the ability of insurers to price based
on health status in the non-group health insurance market before the reform. These regulations could have increased asymmetric information, leading to adverse selection and higher premiums. In contrast, much of the country does
not currently have community rating regulations
in place, but the PPACA institutes them along
with the individual mandate.

Table 2 displays the impact of reform on various measures of health of the insured population
aged 18-64, using variation by state.
Table 2–Evidence by State
Coverage
-1.926∗∗∗
1.492
0.237∗∗∗
-0.170∗∗∗
-0.100∗∗∗
-0.0391∗∗
-0.0428

t statistic
(-0.56)
(-0.75)
( 0.46)
(-1.77)
(-0.91)
(-0.19)
( 2.49)

clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Health Measures and Behaviors

Days Health Not Good
Health Prevented Activity
Exercise
Disability
Need Equipment
Diabetes
Asthma

Coverage
-4.372
-10.28
0.282
-0.808
-0.129
-0.0534
0.360∗∗

t statistic
(-3.01)
( 1.51)
( 4.46)
(-4.37)
(-5.33)
(-2.30)
(-1.65)

clustered at the state level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

See Table A1 for an explanation of the abbreviations. Signs of six of the seven health measures
are consistent with adverse selection, and five of
these are statistically significant. Results at the
county level, reported in Table 3, are broadly
consistent: signs of six of the seven coefficients
2 This coverage increase is consistent with estimates
from other sources, reported in Kolstad and Kowalski
(2010).
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Despite differences in the community rating
environments between Massachusetts and the
nation, our findings are broadly consistent with
the CBO predictions for national reform: premium changes from -1 to 2% in the small group
market and from -3 to 0% in the large group
market (CBO 2009). Comparison with the CBO
estimates suggests that community rating in the
non-group market does not drive our results, unsurprising given that only 5% of the insured in
Massachusetts were in the non-group market before reform and the share was unchanged after
reform (Kolstad and Kowalski (2010)).
The existence of community rating prior to reform also makes the Massachusetts experience
relevant in the case that the Supreme Court finds
the individual mandate unconstitutional but upholds the community rating regulations. Our results suggest that a partial implementation of
PPACA would reduce pooling, leading premiums
to fall by less than they otherwise would or even
increase.
We have demonstrated that there was adverse
selection into health insurance in Massachusetts
before the reform. While this allows us to address some policy relevant questions, our simple sign test does not quantify the magnitude of
the welfare cost of adverse selection. In ongoing
work we extend this approach to estimate welfare
losses due to adverse selection.
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Table A1–Questions from BRFFS

Days not good
Prevented Activity
Exercise
Disability
Equipment
Diabetes
Asthma

Now thinking about your physical health, which includes physical illness and
injury, for how many days during the past 30 days was your physical health
not good?
During the past 30 days, for about how many days did poor physical or mental
health keep you from doing your usual activities, such as self-care, work, or
recreation?
During the past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any
physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or
walking for exercise?
During the past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any
physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or
walking for exercise?
Do you now have any health problem that requires you to use special equipment,
such as a cane, a wheelchair, a special bed, or a special telephone?
Have you ever been told by a doctor that you have diabetes?
Have you ever been told by a doctor, nurse, or other health professional that
you had asthma?
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